“How to Unify Theories of Sensory Affect: An Adverbialist Proposal”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 5(1): 119-133, 2014
“Is Feeling Pain the Perception of Something?”, Journal of Philosophy, 106(10): 531-567, 2009
“A Short Primer on Situated Cognition” (with Philip Robbins) in Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, edited by Philips Robbins & Murat Aydede, Cambridge University Press, 2009
“Cognitive Architecture, Concepts, and Introspection: An Information-Theoretic Solution to the Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness” (with Güven Güzeldere), Noûs, 39(2): 197-255, 2005
I work primarily in philosophy of psychology/cognitive science, and more generally, philosophy of mind. In recent years, I have increasingly focused on perceptual and affective consciousness. My current research involves developing a theory of sensory affect that would also illuminate perceptual consciousness. I have also been working on a book project developing an information-theoretic (but internalist) account of perceptual consciousness and its introspection with phenomenal concepts with an aim to show how to properly respond to various recent anti-physicalist arguments.