BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Department of Philosophy//NONSGML Events//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://philosophy.ubc.ca/events/event/ X-WR-CALDESC:Department of Philosophy - Events BEGIN:VEVENT UID:20251008T2231Z-1759962681.8136-EO-18913-19@10.19.146.24 STATUS:CONFIRMED DTSTAMP:20261007T003810Z CREATED:20240228T193954Z LAST-MODIFIED:20240228T203859Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Vancouver:20240312T123000 DTEND;TZID=America/Vancouver:20240312T140000 SUMMARY: Philosophy Colloquium – Dr. Alan Hájek: ‘Consequentialism\, Cluele ssness\, Clumsiness\, and Counterfactuals’ DESCRIPTION: Abstract: According to objective consequentialism\, a morally right action is one that has the best consequences. (These are not just the immediate consequences of the actions\, but the long-term consequences\, p erhaps until the end of history.) I will argue that on one understanding th is makes no sense\, and on another understanding\, it has a startling metap hysical presupposition concerning […] X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:

Abstract: According to objective consequentialism\, a morally right action is one that has the best consequences. (These are not just the immediate consequences of the actions\, but the long-term consequences\, perhaps until the end of history.) I will argue that on on e understanding this makes no sense\, and on another understanding\, it has a startling metaphysical presupposition concerning counterfactuals. Object ive consequentialism has faced various objections\, including the problem o f “cluelessness”: we have no idea what most of the consequences of our acti ons will be\; they could be catastrophic\, wonderful\, or anywhere in betwe en. I think that on these understandings\, objective consequentialism has a far worse problem: its very foundations are highly dubious. Even granting these foundations\, a worse problem than cluelessness remains\, which I cal l “clumsiness”. Moreover\, I think that these problems quickly generalise t o a number of other moral theories. But the point is most easily made for o bjective consequentialism\, so I will focus largely on it.

I will con sider three ways that objective consequentialism might be improved:
1)     Appeal instead to short-term consequences of actions\;
2)    Under stand consequences with objective probabilities\;
3)    Understand con sequences with subjective/evidential probabilities.

I will argue that 1) still fails\, but that 2) and 3) are the best prospects for consequenti alism.

Bio: Alan Hájek received a BSc. (Hons) in mat hematical statistics at the University of Melbourne\, an M.A. in philosophy at the University of Western Ontario\, and a Ph.D. in philosophy at Prince ton University. He has taught at the University of Melbourne and Caltech\, before joining the Philosophy Program at the Research School of Social Scie nces\, Australian National University\, as Professor of Philosophy in 2005. He has been a Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities since 200 7. He was the President of the Australasian Association of Philosophy\, 200 9-10. He won the American Philosophical Association Article Prize for “the best article published in the previous two years” by a “younger scholar”\, for “What Conditional Probability Could Not Be”\, 2004. Two of his articles were selected by The Philosopher’s Annual as “one of the ten best articles in philosophy” in the previous year: “Waging War on Pascal’s Wage r”\, 2004\, and “Degrees of Commensurability and the Repugnant Conclusion”\ , with Wlodek Rabinowicz\, 2022.

 

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