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UID:20251010T1802Z-1760119335.7048-EO-20542-19@10.19.146.22
STATUS:CONFIRMED
DTSTAMP:20260914T204509Z
CREATED:20251223T230900Z
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SUMMARY: Philosophy Colloquium – Dr. Samiksha Goyal (Simon Fraser Universit
 y)
DESCRIPTION: Title: Gandhi\, Williams\, and the Problem of Interest-relativ
 ity Abstract: As against the utilitarian claim that moral agents should max
 imize utility and the deontological claim that the agents should follow dut
 y-based view\, Bernard Williams argues that we should disregard these moral
  theories because they alienate moral agency from the agent’s own point of 
 view. While Williams […]
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html: <p><img class="alignnone wp-image-20672 size-
 full" src="https://phil.cms.arts.ubc.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/19/2025/12
 /2026-02-13-PHIL-Colloquia-Goyal.jpg" alt="" width="2000" height="1125" /><
 /p><p><strong>Title: Gandhi\, Williams\, and the Problem of Interest-relati
 vity<br /></strong></p><p><strong>Abstract:<br /></strong>As against the ut
 ilitarian claim that moral agents should maximize utility and the deontolog
 ical claim that the agents should follow duty-based view\, Bernard Williams
  argues that we should disregard these moral theories because they alienate
  moral agency from the agent’s own point of view. While Williams makes a we
 ll-motivated claim to resist moral theories which alienate agents from thei
 r own viewpoint\, his view opens a problem of interest-relativity.</p><p>In
 terest-relativity is a form of relativism according to which the standards 
 of rightness and wrongness of moral judgements are relative to an agent’s i
 nterests and desires. I argue that introducing Mohandas Gandhi’s notion of 
 detachment—lack of excessive attachments to one’s interests and commitment—
 allows us to retain the agent’s point of view without the attendant interes
 t-relativity. Given that Gandhi’s moral theory remains underdeveloped withi
 n the philosophical canon\, my argument both explicates and theorises Gandh
 i’s notion of detachment.</p><p><strong>Bio:</strong><br />Samiksha Goyal i
 s a Postdoctoral Fellow with the Extending New Narratives Project at Simon 
 Fraser University\, Canada. She holds a PhD from Monash University\, Austra
 lia and an MPhil from University of Delhi. Her research interests are in th
 e history of philosophy and moral philosophy\, with a particular focus on I
 ndian classical texts and modern Indian thinkers such as Mohandas Gandhi an
 d Rājchandra Rai. Her work examines the moral significance of detachment an
 d its role in virtue ethics. Her research has been published in journals su
 ch as Journal of Dharma Studies\, Economic and Political Weekly\, and the A
 PA Newsletter on Asian and Asian American Philosophers and Philosophies.</p
 >
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