On a Fregean view of communication\, communica tion requires shared sense. On a Russellian view\, it requires onl y shared reference and fulfillment of what I will call transactional re quirements. My first aim is to illustrate that the Fregean view is dia lectically unstable\, for reasons not usually discussed. However\, even amo ng those who shy away from a Fregean view of communication\, hesitation to embrace a Russellian view is common\, so my second aim is to ask whether th is hesitation is justified. I do so by clarifying the relationship between Russellianism about communication and relationism about communication: a view which may seem to provide a third option. I’ll suggest a way to adjudicate between these two views\, by clarifying a commitment shared by the Fregean and the relationist\, but rejected by the Russellian. If this c ommitment is justified\, then given the instability of the Fregean view\, r elationism is preferable. If not\, traditional dissatisfaction with a Russe llian view of communication is undermotivated.
Speaker
Bio:
Rachel Goodman is Associate Professor of Philosop hy at the University of Illinois\, Chicago. She works in the philosophy of mind and language\, with a special interest in the nature of representation \, questions about mental reference and 'singular thought'\, and connected issues about reference in the philosophy of language.
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