

UBC Department of Philosophy Colloquium

ERIC HOCHSTEIN

UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA



When Pluralisms Collide

Scientific Pluralism has garnered a great deal of philosophical attention in recent years. Despite this, it's not always clear what exactly "scientific pluralism" is intended to describe, or what follows from it epistemically or metaphysically. For some, scientific pluralism is a claim about the nature of our methodological and representational practices in science, and their inability to produce a single coherent unified account of a complex phenomenon (what I call "methodological pluralism"). For others, however, pluralism is a claim about the world itself and the disunity that exists within phenomena (what I call "metaphysical pluralism"). Those who argue for metaphysical pluralism often do so by suggesting that this may be the best explanation for why our scientific methodologies produce models and theories which cannot integrate. In other words, it is often suggested that methodological pluralism provides strong evidence for metaphysical pluralism. In this talk, I explore the relationship between methodological and metaphysical pluralism. I propose that instead of providing evidence for metaphysical pluralism, the successes of methodological pluralism in science actually provide evidence against it. In this respect, the relationship between the different kinds of scientific pluralism is far more fraught than traditionally interpreted. Being one kind of scientific pluralist may require that we give up being another.

FOR MORE INFORMATION,
PLEASE VISIT
[www.philosophy.ubc.ca/
community/colloquia](http://www.philosophy.ubc.ca/community/colloquia)

FRIDAY, February 16

BUCH A103 4:00 – 6:00pm



THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA