


UBC Department of Philosophy Colloquium



JENNIFER WANG

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Fundamental Counterparts

Shamik Dasgupta (2009, 2017) has presented an argument with the startling conclusion that fundamentally, there are no such things as individuals. His target is *individualism*, the thesis

that there are fundamental individuals in the material universe. But the rejection of individualism is a radical thesis and would have implications for much of contemporary metaphysics. I want to explore ways to resist a key move in Dasgupta's argument, one that turns on considerations in the metaphysics of modality. In the course of doing so, I will discuss issues concerning how to individuate fundamental individuals.

FRIDAY, October 26th BUCH A202 3:00 – 5:00

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