I specialize in normativity, and I like to call the bulk of what I do meta-normativity. So I look at first-order inquiries in ethics, prudence, rationality, epistemology, political philosophy and philosophy of law, and gravitate toward the second-order semantic, meta-semantic, metaphysical, epistemic, psychological and logical questions that arise. Sometimes I stick to the first-order inquires to weigh in on what matters and what reasons we have.
Recent and Upcoming Presentations
University of Michigan Summer Workshop on The Science of Ethics, June 2013, TBD (but on evolutionary debunking arguments)
Pacific APA, March 2013, “Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency” (with Oisin Deery and Shaun Nichols)
Canadian Philosophical Association Roundtable on Fitting Attitudes, May 2012, ‘Fitting Attitudes and Expressivism’