Aaron Henry, Sessional

Sessional Instructor
phone 604 822 8853
location_on Buchanan D 305

About

Office Hours 2023W, term 2:

  • Thursdays & Fridays, 1:30pm – 2:30pm, or by appointment
  • On Zoom only (email aaron.henry@ubc.ca)

About Me

I work in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. My research focuses on the psychological mechanisms whereby agents direct control to what they are doing, and the role these mechanisms play in structuring the agent’s experience of acting. I am especially interested in the role that attention plays in each of these processes. Currently, I am developing an account of the ‘norm’ or ‘constitutive aim’ of attention, according to which attention aims at avoiding what is distracting to the agent, or, more positively, at prioritizing what is relevant to the agent. Among its explanatory virtues, the account delivers a satisfying explanation of why, in a central range of cases, the agent qualifies as acting when making a mistake (i.e., acting in ways that they do not intend to). Specifically, I propose that, in making a mistake, the agent’s behaviour manifests as defective exercise of their attentional capacities – namely, the capacity to prioritize what is relevant to them in light of their goals (or ‘priorities’ as an agent). This casts new light on the normative structure of attention, while also helping to resolve outstanding puzzles in action theory. For more information about my research, please see my website.


Teaching


Aaron Henry, Sessional

Sessional Instructor
phone 604 822 8853
location_on Buchanan D 305

About

Office Hours 2023W, term 2:

  • Thursdays & Fridays, 1:30pm – 2:30pm, or by appointment
  • On Zoom only (email aaron.henry@ubc.ca)

About Me

I work in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. My research focuses on the psychological mechanisms whereby agents direct control to what they are doing, and the role these mechanisms play in structuring the agent’s experience of acting. I am especially interested in the role that attention plays in each of these processes. Currently, I am developing an account of the ‘norm’ or ‘constitutive aim’ of attention, according to which attention aims at avoiding what is distracting to the agent, or, more positively, at prioritizing what is relevant to the agent. Among its explanatory virtues, the account delivers a satisfying explanation of why, in a central range of cases, the agent qualifies as acting when making a mistake (i.e., acting in ways that they do not intend to). Specifically, I propose that, in making a mistake, the agent’s behaviour manifests as defective exercise of their attentional capacities – namely, the capacity to prioritize what is relevant to them in light of their goals (or ‘priorities’ as an agent). This casts new light on the normative structure of attention, while also helping to resolve outstanding puzzles in action theory. For more information about my research, please see my website.


Teaching


Aaron Henry, Sessional

Sessional Instructor
phone 604 822 8853
location_on Buchanan D 305
About keyboard_arrow_down

Office Hours 2023W, term 2:

  • Thursdays & Fridays, 1:30pm – 2:30pm, or by appointment
  • On Zoom only (email aaron.henry@ubc.ca)

About Me

I work in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. My research focuses on the psychological mechanisms whereby agents direct control to what they are doing, and the role these mechanisms play in structuring the agent’s experience of acting. I am especially interested in the role that attention plays in each of these processes. Currently, I am developing an account of the ‘norm’ or ‘constitutive aim’ of attention, according to which attention aims at avoiding what is distracting to the agent, or, more positively, at prioritizing what is relevant to the agent. Among its explanatory virtues, the account delivers a satisfying explanation of why, in a central range of cases, the agent qualifies as acting when making a mistake (i.e., acting in ways that they do not intend to). Specifically, I propose that, in making a mistake, the agent’s behaviour manifests as defective exercise of their attentional capacities – namely, the capacity to prioritize what is relevant to them in light of their goals (or ‘priorities’ as an agent). This casts new light on the normative structure of attention, while also helping to resolve outstanding puzzles in action theory. For more information about my research, please see my website.

Teaching keyboard_arrow_down