My work primarily lies in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and philosophy of law. Before coming to UBC, I was a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at the University of Oxford from 2018 to 2021, and a Research Fellow at King’s College London from 2016 to 2018.

Among the other things it allows us to do, perception permits us to think about the observable properties of objects (e.g. their colour, their shape, their size, etc.). One strand of my research investigates what this fact should lead us to say about perception and thought. In addition, I write about nearby issues in philosophy of mind, epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of language. I am particularly interested in debates about reference, quantification, communication, and the rational significance of perceptual experience.

I also have a sideline in philosophy of law. My forays into legal theory began with the foundations of general jurisprudence, but now also encompass questions about privacy.

• ‘Hallucination Without Sensible Qualities’ (forthcoming) The Relational View of Perception: New Essays (eds. O. Beck and F. Masrour)
• ‘On the Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Structure’ (2024) Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1): 1-23.
• ‘Russell on Propositions’ (2022) Routledge Handbook of Propositions (eds. A. Murray and C. Tillman). [w/Fatema Amijee]
• ‘Thinking Through Illusion’ (2020) European Journal of Philosophy 28 (3): 617-638.
• ‘Thought about Properties: Why the Perceptual Case is Basic’ (2018) Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271): 221-242.
• ‘On the Explanatory Power of Hallucination’ (2017) Synthèse 194: 1765-1785. [w/ M. Arsenault]