This course provides an advanced introduction to contemporary work on the ‘mind-body problem.’ This is the problem of understanding the metaphysical relationship between the mental and the physical. Our discussion will be organized around the thesis of ‘physicalism’: the thesis that, in a sense to be made precise, everything is physical. We will begin by asking how best to formulate the thesis of physicalism, focusing on what the physicalist means by ‘everything’ and what they mean by ‘physical.’ Having done so, we will turn to the topic of mental causation. According to many physicalists, the reality of mental causation provides a powerful source of support for their position. Our goal will be to understand why they have thought this and assess whether they are right. After considering debates about mental causation, we’ll turn to questions about mental content, i.e., the ‘aboutness’ of mental states. We will consider some influential physicalist attempts to explain mental content as well as the principal challenges that have dogged physicalist accounts of mental content. From content, we turn finally to consciousness. Here, we’ll consider the arguments that contemporary ‘dualists’ have offered for believing that the existence of consciousness is inconsistent with physicalism, as well as the main ways physicalists have attempted to rebut these dualist arguments. In the time that we have left, we’ll examine some historically neglected views of the mind-body relationship that have been receiving increased attention recently. We’ll discuss: ‘mysterianism’ (the view that the relation between consciousness and the physical lies forever beyond the cognitive grasp of humans); ‘illusionism’ (the view that consciousness is illusory); ‘panpsychism’ (the view that mind or consciousness is somehow woven into the physical fabric of the cosmos); and even some varieties of ‘idealism’ (the view that everything, including the physical cosmos, is a mental construction).